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The modern/postmodern debate is usually presented as one of universality vs. relativism, 
rationalism vs. irrationalism and emancipation vs. deconstruction. This article tries to 
critically expose and critique Habermas’s discussion of postmodernism as a way of 
highlighting some of the limitations of this lively discussion. This is to be accomplished 
through a conceptual analysis of Habermas’s   defense of modernity against the 
postmodernism of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault as elaborated in Habermas’s 
work The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Through such an analysis, I will argue for 
the following points. (1) Habermas’s discourse of modernity provides better accounts of 
responsibility and emancipation compared to the postmodernism of Derrida and Foucault. 
(2) Still, Habermas’s discourse of modernity fails to fully address asymmetrical power 
relations and (3) Habermas’s modernity is Eurocentric in failing to fully deconstruct the 
Eurocentric tendencies of the philosophical tradition of which it’s a part. 
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The modern/postmodern debate possesses an 
interdisciplinary significance. This is predicated 
on the assumption that modern forms of 
knowledge, both in the social and natural 
sciences are the logical outcome of modernity’s 
attempt to evolve its own normative criteria of 
truth and thereby detach itself from the 
premodern world of tradition and authority. Thus 
the modern/postmodern debate is a matter of 
deciding whether modern society’s conception of 
history, universal progress and the enlightened 
self should be preserved, or there is a need to 
herald a postmodern age where the repressive 
and absolutist facets of modernity are left behind 
for a diversified and fragmented approach that’s 
critical towards accepted realities. In this debate 
the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas 
emerges as a strong defender of the values of 
Enlightenment and modernity, whereas Jacques 
Derrida and Michel Foucault are categorized 
under the postmodernist approach which is 
critical towards modern progress, modern 




What permeates all works of Habermas is an 
attempt to reformulate and critically appropriate 
the values of modernity and the Enlightenment as 
a way of both diagnosing and providing a remedy 
for today’s society’s problems. In this process, 
Habermas becomes highly critical towards 
postmodernism which he conceives as a farewell 
to modern society’s emancipatory potentials 
embedded in everyday communication.  
 
The essay starts by discussing Habermas’s 
attempt to situate modernity as a project in terms 
of its difference from modernism, modernization 
and postmodernism. Section two constitutes a 
critical exposition of Habermas’s views on 
postmodernism. Here, I will particularly focus on 
Habermas’s discussion of Derrida and Foucault 
in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.  
Finally in section three I try to introduce my own 
individual insights into the debate through 
identifying the positive and negative aspects of 








MATERIALS AND METHODS 
  Methodologically, the research is based on 
qualitative approaches depending up on the 
literature review of secondary sources like books, 
documents and Journals related to the topic. 
 
Modernity, Modernism, Modernization and 
Postmodernism 
 Habermas’s way of comprehending the issue 
of modernity is to situate it in terms of other 
concepts like modernization, modernism and 
postmodernism. Generally the concept of 
modernity is usually crystallized around the 
development of rationality in the modern 
European period which is supposedly 
individualistic, reflective, and multidimensional in 
trying to question every aspect of our lives. For 
Habermas, modernity is a realization of 
communicative rationality which makes explicit 
the implicit communicative potential of modern 
societies. Thus modernity differs from 
modernization, which broadly refers to how 
rationality was interpreted in science and 
technology signifying material achievements in 
the modern period. Today, as Habermas sees it, 
Weber’s rationalization appears under a theme of 
‘modernization’. Accordingly, modernization 
supposedly consists of various ideals affirming 
others which are related to ideas like increase in 
accumulated wealth, productivity, mobilization of 
resources, emergence of central administration, 
urbanization, secularization, increase in rights 
and participation in government, and so on. 
Habermas contends that the theory of 
modernization changes Weber’s occidental 
rationalization and abandonment of religious 
world-views in two senses. On the one hand, 
seeing modernity as a universal model and 
criteria against which developments of societies 
will be assessed. On the other, abandoning 
accounts of the rationalization of the life world so 
that modernity and rationality will be uncoupled 
(Habermas, 1987).  
 
Habermas also insisted in distinguishing 
modernity from modernism which criticizes the 
exaggerated and destructive facets of modern 
rationality and instead tries to bring the aesthetic 
dimension into focus. In The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, Habermas clearly states 
that he is trying to discuss modernity from a 
philosophical and not an aesthetic angle. Here, 
he distinguishes modernity from modernism, 
which is a certain movement in art and literature 
that could be seen as a critique of modernity. 
Modernism amongst other things advocated new 
and unusual ideas in art and literature, new 
conceptions of time, limitations of modern culture, 
exaggerated rationality, ills of capitalism, urban 
life and so on. Habermas claims that historically; 
“the mentality of aesthetic modernity begins to 
take shape clearly with Baudelaire and with his 
theory of art, influenced as it was by Edgar Allan 
Poe. It then unfolded in the avant garde artistic 
movements and finally attained its zenith with 
surrealism and the Dadaists of the cafe Voltaire” 
(Benhabib, 1997).  
 
Finally Habermas’s modernity stands 
contrarily to postmodernism which envisages an 
abandonment of modern rationality in favor of a 
heterogeneous, diverse approach that addresses 
the complexity of human life. For Habermas, one 
could identify two facets of postmodernism. A 
‘neoconservative’ one, which doubts the process 
of rationalization that is said to have taken place 
in the West and also, an ‘anarchist’ one which 
admits that modernity is rationalization but 
asserts that reason with the collapse of modernity 
is manifesting itself as repressive and 
instrumental (Habermas, 1987). Thus, modernity 
could be seen in how it defends an emancipatory 
ideal of rationality which differs from 
modernization, modernism and postmodernism.  
 
Habermas’s discourse of modernity heavily 
draws on the sociology of Max Weber and 
Hegel’s philosophical insights o the modern age 
as a way of situating the issue of modernity. 
Habermas appropriates Weber’s notion of 
rationalization or the process through which a 
secular culture emerged in the modern West, 
coupled with the Hegelian notion that it’s the 
principle of freedom or subjectivity that best 
expresses the spirit of the modern age. 
Habermas begins his characterization of 
modernity by a discussion of the rationalization of 
the life world found in Weber’s sociology of 
religion. Thus for Habermas, Weber “designates 
as rationalization every expansion of empirical 
knowledge, of predictive capacity, of instrumental 
and organizational mastery of empirical 
processes” (Habermas, 1984). In his sociology of 
religion, Max Weber talks of how the 
abandonment and distancing from religious 
accounts led to a process of rationalization in the 
West. Accordingly, the abandoning of the 
religious world views goes along with the 
emergence of three ‘value-spheres’ manifesting a 
secular outlook. There emerged theoretical, 
practical and aesthetic spheres (Habermas, 
1987). This for Habermas is a process involving 
examination of one’s own cultural background, 
emergence of universal norms and values, the 
rise of a communicative rationality and how the 
individual identities emerge in this process.  




Following the famous German historian 
Reinhart Koselleck, Habermas asserts that terms 
like modern, modernity and modernization have 
in them an idea of striving for a future potential, 
progress and actualization. Especially during 
Hegel, history comes to be conceived as a 
continuous process moving towards progress. 
Radical and revolutionary concepts emerged in 
the eighteenth century in general and Hegelian 
philosophy in particular, that are supposed to be 
manifestations of the novel and unique age. 
Hence, “words such as revolution, progress, 
emancipation, development, crisis and zeitgeist” 
(Habermas, 1987) emerged signifying the radical 
nature of the present. According to Hegel, the 
essence of the modern age lies in its principle of 
‘subjectivity’. This principle can be further divided 
into the ideals of individualism, right to criticism, 
autonomy and idealism. Rather than appealing to 
any tradition, or higher authority, the individual 
was seen as the proper subject and starting point 
of reflection. This was related to criticism and the 
fact that nothing was to be exempted from critical 
examination. This in turn, implies autonomy or 
freedom of humans, or the individual, to reflect on 
the modern condition. Finally reason was 
conceived as the tool of this world that’s to be 
utilized for interrogation, aiming at the truth 
(Habermas, 1987). This principle of subjectivity 
for Hegel was established through key historical 
movements like the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment and French revolution.  
 
The significance of the reformation lies in its 
focus on the primacy of the individual and how he 
or she independently relates to God rather than 
the authority of Bible, the church or religious 
figures. Enlightenment further asserted the 
supremacy of reason by advocating reason’s 
ability to provide solutions for our social, political, 
economic, artistic and generally all aspects of our 
lives. Further, in the French revolution, the status 
of traditional laws and the state were eroded as a 
result of the assertion of individual freedom and 
liberty. As a result of this, modern forms of 
inquiries and generally modern life came to be 
organized around the principle of subjectivity. 
First of all, the natural sciences rejected any 
super natural explanations and in turn focused on 
the idea of a reflecting subject knowing nature 
that’s already available as a raw data. Also in 
morality, moral concepts originated from reason 
and human authority, and the freedom of 
individual members designating what’s right and 
wrong, and inconsistent with the common good. 
In art, especially Romanticism, the individual and 
its inward experiences were emphasized.  
 
In philosophy, the principle of subjectivity was 
established in Descartes cogito; where there is a 
mind-body dualism and the thinking ‘I’ is the 
starting point of reflection. It reached its highest 
stage, in Kant and the division of reason into 
three spheres and hence the further articulation 
of subjectivity. Kant, in his critique of pure reason, 
tries to put an end to the dilemmas of the 
metaphysical tradition and its exaggerated 
reason by limiting knowledge to things as they 
appear to us, and in turn dividing this possible 
cognition into three spheres, and putting the 
subject as starting point of reflection. Hence; “by 
the end of the eighteenth century, science, 
morality and art were even institutionally 
differentiated as realms of activity in which 
questions of truth, of justice, and of taste were 
autonomously elaborated, that is, each under its 
own specific aspect of validity.” (Habermas, 
1987) Here, what interests Habermas, is to what 
extent modernity has managed to detach itself 
from pre-modern times, from where it borrows its 
criteria of truth, right and wrong and generally 
truth. Habermas also asks, to what extent does 
the past affect the ‘modern’ not just the present 
but the novel present? Here Habermas claimed in 
his radical thesis on modernity that: “Modernity 
can and will no longer borrow the criteria by 
which it takes its orientation from the models 
supplied by another epoch; it has to create its 
normativity out of itself.” (ibid) 
  
Habermas here is claiming that because of the 
rationalization of the life world, and distancing 
from religious world views, three value spheres 
arise i.e. that of theoretical, practical and 
aesthetic. Thus for Habermas, “modern 
structures of consciousness emerged from the 
universal- historical process of worldview 
rationalization, that is from the disenchantment of 
religious-metaphysical worldviews”(Habermas, 
1984). These spheres are related to the life world 
and its validity claims in everyday communicative 
processes relating to the objective, social and 
subjective worlds. What this implies, is that it is 
from the raising and contestation of different 
validity claims that modernity infers its criteria of 
good, bad and generally truth. So, modernity has 
succeeded in creating its own criteria’s and tools 
for arriving at the truth. 
 
Habermas tries to locate the ‘unpursued’ path 
in modern rationality, which is communicative 
reason. This is a reason fuelled by the 
rationalization of the life world in relation to pre-
modern grounds of tradition and authority. 
Habermas’s rationality is based on the day to day 
communicative practices of modern societies, 
their standard speech acts and the distinct claims 




raised in relation to the objective, social and 
subjective dimensions of reality. The essence of 
communicative rationality lies in how language 
coordinates actions; how actors in an 
intersubjective communicative process tend to 
respect some rules and in the process how 
understanding is to be achieved. In the 
communicative paradigm, when a speech act is 
forwarded, the one to which it’s directed, 
recognizes it and thereby offers a reply 
establishing an intersubjective communicative 
process. What makes this communicative 
process possible are the shared backgrounds of 
meanings and idealizing presuppositions that 
guide communicative processes, and also the 
fact that those in communication are, oriented 
towards consensus. Thus in Habermas, “by 
combining the theories of communicative action 
and social evolution a theory of modernity is 
generated that is intended to explain the specific 
rationalization processes of modernity” (Owen, 
2002).  
 
In Habermas’s communicative rationality, the 
life world is what integrates the individuals as a 
whole by forming a common meaning. It’s the 
context in which individuals dwell and affirm their 
uniqueness by presenting their claims. The life 
world is to be deciphered through everyday 
communicative action, but by itself, its “always 
only ‘co-given’ and has to evade thematization” 
(Habermas, 1987).One could easily look at 
speech acts and validity claims, and identify an 
intersubjectively communicative process, but the 
life world on the contrary, is what lies behind 
everyday communication, supplying materials to 
be reflected upon and a shared meaning that ties 
individuals and brings them into a communicative 
arena. 
 
     In pre-modern forms of life, tradition and 
authority were what dictated the everyday world 
and the life world. On the move from pre-modern 
to modern forms of life, generally in “cultural 
level” the basic traditionally conservative 
concepts that lay at the ground of the horizon 
begun to shift into concepts to be reflected upon, 
principles to be argued upon the “societal level”. 
Thus, new general roles and universal moral 
insights began to emerge out of those particular 
roles based on religion, authority and myth. 
Finally “on the level of personality” the cognitive 
structures acquired in the process of socialization 
are dissociated ever more emphatically from the 
contents of cultural knowledge with which they 
were initially integrated in “concrete thinking” 
(Habermas, 1987). 
 
Habermas claims that his theory of 
communicative action is one that entertains a 
mutual relation between everyday world and the 
life world, instead of one being subsumed into the 
other. As Finlayson puts it; “The life world has 
several functions. It provides the context for 
action... on the one hand; it is a force for social 
integration. At the very same time the platform of 
agreement that the life world provides is the 
condition of the possibility of critical reflection and 
possible disagreement.” (Finlayson, 2005, 52-53)  
Habermas admits that especially with the advent 
of capitalism, the life world and everyday 
communicative action are more and more 
threatened by the instrumental rationality of state 
and economy. This is what he calls the 
colonization of the life world. But what is the 
colonization of the life world?  
 
to begin with the steering media of money 
and power became uncoupled from the life 
world. As the net works of instrumental action 
increase in their density and complicity so 
they gradually intrude into the life world and 
absorb its functions. As the domain of the life 
world shrinks a whole gamut of what 
Habermas calls’ social pathologies arise 
(Finlayson, 2005). 
 
Still, whereas the radical critics equate, in 
some cases, reasoning with repression, and in 
others, call for the renewal of archaic, 
heterogeneous forces out of the bounds of the 
modern, Habermas sees the only alternative as 
one of strengthening the life world and everyday 
communicative action as the locus of critical 
reflection and hence grounds for the emergence 
of a critical social theory of society. 
 
Habermas and Postmodernism 
 What motivated Habermas’s discussion of the 
philosophical discourse of modernity is the 
postmodernist movement as it grew out of what 
was referred to as the poststructuralism of 
especially Foucault and Derrida. Habermas 
basically tries to preserve and reformulate the 
values of the Enlightenment and the modern 
process of rationalization in general, by 
strengthening the communicative rationality 
which is implicitly being practiced in the day to 
day lives of modern societies. Along these lines, 
Habermas developed a critique of the 
postmodernist movements of Derrida and 
Foucault in particular.  Still, what is 
postmodernism, and why does Habermas view it 
as a threat to Modernity, Enlightenment and 
communicative rationality? 
 




 The word postmodern is usually employed to 
specify intellectual positions which in one way or 
another tried or managed to degrade/undermine 
the assumptions which lie at the core of Western 
civilization especially modern society. Thus, the 
postmodernist venture exposed and severely 
criticized capitalism, globalization, 
anthropocentrism and metaphysical speculation 
amongst others. As Walter Truett Anderson sees 
it, Postmodernism “ to some, it means funny 
architecture, to others, French intellectuals you 
can’t understand; to still others, anything weird, 
campy, trendy or high tech. Some people equate 
it with the idea that all values and beliefs are 
equal” (Anderson, 1995). As Anderson sees it, 
besides tracing the emergence of the postmodern 
historically, one way of addressing the 
postmodern issue, is focusing on distinguishing 
between ‘postmodernity’ and ‘postmodernism’. 
‘Postmodernity’ constitutes the state in which our 
basic values, ‘grand narrative’, metaphysical 
systems, historiography, and our lives in general 
are currently being questioned. In this context, 
‘Postmodernism’ relates to the various theoretical 
formulations trying to articulated this chaotic and 
fragmented situation, and trying to translate it and 
make it part of their theoretical explications and 
critiques. (Anderson, 1995) Thus alongside these 
lines Steven Best argued that “ the prefix ‘post’ is 
ambiguous to the extent that it has temporal and 
philosophical meanings, signifying both a 
movement after and rejection of modern 
movements in theory and the arts” (Best, 2005).  
 
Jean Francois Lyotard’s The postmodern 
condition, a report on knowledge; is usually taken 
as a pioneering work in terms of introducing the 
term postmodernism in philosophical circles. 
Lyotard pictured the postmodern condition as one 
in which uniform conceptions of history; 
universalistic ideals of science and knowledge, 
religious narratives, metaphysical stories have 
lost their capacities to stand as adequate 
guidelines for our lives. This in turn has led to the 
emergence of different narratives, stories and 
guidelines. 
 
As Lawrence Cahoone, in his from modernism 
to postmodernism, an anthology sees it; there are 
certain traits that unify the postmodernists. These 
include, dynamism in terms of signs, abandoning 
the search for origins and focusing on 
frameworks of construction and interpretation. 
Further, postmodernists usually argue that 
“knowledge is something humanly made” coupled 
with the contextualization of values and norms 
and critique of exploitative, ‘repressive’ forms of 
rationality. Finally most postmodernists employ a 
“notorious difficult writing style” (Cahoone, 2003). 
For Richard Rorty, one way of recasting, the 
modern/postmodern debate is to situate it in 
terms of the Habermas/Lyotard controversy. 
While Habermas working within Kant ,Hegel and 
Weber’s views, focuses on the development of 
three value spheres, the emergence of a distinct 
consciousness of time, and rationalization of the 
life world; Lyotard, on the other hand, describes 
the downfall of ‘grand narratives’ and 
overarching, all encompassing forms of 
speculations. Lyotard for Habermas leaves the 
scene with no basis for critique, while Habermas 
for Lyotard presents nothing but another ‘grand 
Narrative’ in his communicative rationality (Rorty, 
1984). In the following sections, we are going to 
look at Habermas’s critique of Derrida and 
Foucault’s analysis of modernity.  
 
Deconstruction Versus Communicative 
Rationality  
In developing a position that tries to reform 
Western modernity, Habermas came up with a 
communicative rationality that excavates reason 
as a communicative tool and is critical of the 
different dimensions of life, and thereby furthers 
the project of modernity. In his work, The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Habermas 
tries to show where the critics of modernity have 
been misguided. He shows that their 
misunderstandings are largely situated within the 
assumptions of the paradigm of consciousness or 
philosophy of the subject. In the philosophy of the 
subject, the focus is on the autonomous ego 
which is used to build grand systems and 
theories. As an alternative, Habermas tires to 
conceive knowledge, rationality and truth 
generally in terms of the participation of free 
individuals in a communicative process, where 
empirically testable and disputable claims are to 
be raised. In this regard, Habermas appealed to 
universal pragmatics which purports to articulate 
the universal and unavoidable presuppositions 
that are operative in the successful employment 
of speech acts oriented to achieving mutual 
understanding. Thus universal pragmatics “as a 
reconstructive science, investigates the ‘universal 
and unavoidable presuppositions’, that are 
operative in the successful employment of 
speech acts oriented to achieving mutual 
understanding” (Badillo, 1991). 
 
As Habermas sees it, one of the followers of 
Nietzsche’s idea that, philosophical discourses 
are not about logic and argumentation, but 
employment of the better rhetoric against lesser 
ones, is Jacques Derrida. One could see how 
Derrida’s general project of deconstruction stands 
against Habermas’s communicative rationality in 
two senses. First Derrida negates communicative 




rationality and the three validity claims by 
emphasizing the infinite referral of meaning and 
showing that everyday communication is affected 
by abnormal, poetic and artistic uses of language. 
Secondly, he undermines Habermas’s 
understanding of the specialized forms of inquiry, 
and specifically the status of philosophical 
discourse, by arguing that, there is no distinction 
between logic and rhetoric, and that all texts can 
be analyzed in literary-rhetorical terms.  
 
 Habermas’s discussion of Derrida starts by 
pointing out the relation between Derrida’s 
‘deconstruction’ and Heidegger’s ‘destruction’ of 
the western metaphysical tradition. Accordingly, 
both Heidegger and Derrida, tried to make a 
general analysis of the philosophical tradition with 
an aim of trying to show the limitations and the 
extent to which the metaphysical tradition can be 
justified. For Heidegger, analysis of the whole 
meant looking at history of metaphysics, 
exposing its ‘forgetfulness’ of Being, and trying to 
establish a new analysis in the Dasein Analytic. 
In Derrida, what we have is a criticism of the 
whole metaphysical tradition as trying to base 
itself in an absolute, certain, truth that is to be 
expressed in speech and serves as a foundation 
for all discussions. So, deconstruction, takes a 
form of destructing the history of philosophy by 
exposing its foundations, criticizing its 
dichotomies and finally emphasizing an intrinsic 
relation between the different oppositions and 
show how meaning is produced through these 
relations. Thus Habermas claims that there is an 
affinity between Heidegger’s destruction and 
Derrida’s Deconstruction (Habermas, 1987). 
Even though, Derrida followed Heidegger in 
making an analysis of the whole metaphysical 
tradition and arguing for its exposure, still he was 
against the kind of views Heidegger developed 
on his later years towards Being, language and 
truth.  
 
So, why did Heidegger turn to language? In 
his Dasein Analytic, Heidegger tried to construct 
the structures that made possible Dasein’s 
visibility and day to day life. But, later, Heidegger 
bestowed to language a status of revealing the 
status of an absolute truth i.e. the truth of Being. 
As, Habermas puts it, Derrida was against 
Heidegger’s tendency to see language as starting 
with a truth of Being. This “metaphorics of 
proximity, of simple and immediate presence” is 
what Derrida rejects, according to Habermas. 
Here we can ask, to what does Derrida refers to 
by the metaphysical tradition. For, Derrida, 
metaphysics is mainly characterized by two main 
assumptions. Looking for an absolute and certain 
ground to base our discussions of truth, morality, 
reality, knowledge, values and so on; and also a 
binary, oppositional way of thinking, where one 
part of the dichotomy is said to be inferior to the 
other (Ryan, 1982). So, has Heidegger 
succumbed to the metaphysical tradition? For 
Derrida, First, even though there is distinction 
between Being and beings in Heidegger, still the 
focus is on forgetfulness of Being. The whole 
tradition has been focused on contemplating 
beings and entities for Heidegger. Instead he 
tries to address the concealed issue of being as 
such. Dasein is only significant in so far as it is 
able to address this ultimate forgetfulness. Also, 
Heidegger’s insistence on grounding everything 
on an ultimate reality is seen in his later views on 
language where beings are not active producers 
of truth but only channels through which the truth 
of Being is manifested in the language they 
speak. Habermas is also against Heidegger’s 
understanding of language, because this kind of 
analysis is against his idea that, truth is to be 
found in the three validity claims and the ability of 
participants in an intersubjective communication 
to convince each other through the raising and 
defending of these claims. This is because, in 
Heidegger, truth is not something we produce, 
but simply a manifestation of a higher reality.  
 
     Acknowledging the limitations of Heidegger’s 
analysis, Derrida according to Habermas, turned 
his face to an analysis of language inspired by 
structuralism. Derrida took from structuralism its 
insistence on analyzing meaning not based on 
some external, absolute, metaphysical criteria but 
simply by looking at how meaning is produced in 
relation to a system of signs. Thus Derrida 
asserts “ as modern structural thought has clearly 
realized, language is a system of signs and 
linguistics is part and parcel of the science of 
signs” ( Derrida, 1997). Still, the Structuralist ideal 
of trying to come up with objective structures that 
can be used to analyze day to day language was 
rejected by Derrida. Instead, Derrida’s attempt 
was to expose the foundations of language as 
being metaphysical in their Nature (Habermas, 
1987). Still, how could one criticize metaphysics 
by criticizing language? 
 
      As we saw earlier, one of the ways through 
which Derrida characterized metaphysics, is in 
terms of thinking in dichotomies of superiority and 
inferiority. Here Derrida focused on the 
speech/writing binary, where speech is favored. 
Derrida wanted to apply his Deconstruction 
against this Binary. But, first what is 
deconstruction? Deconstruction is an attempt to 
expose the nature of texts, and according to 
some, it takes the form of exposing binaries, 
reversing the relation between the binaries, and 




finally showing that the two components of the 
binaries are not inferior or superior to one another 
but are simply interdependent, since meaning is 
produced by them excluding and differing from 
one another. Alongside these lines the 
‘logocentric’ tendency of the metaphysical 
tradition focuses on the search for something 
absolute clear and self-evident, while it’s 
‘Phonocentrism’ emphasizes how speech is able 
to convey this i.e. the highest truth, more than 
writing. Hence “To this degree, Phonocentrism 
and logocentrism are akin to one another” 
(Habermas, 1987). In of Grammatology Derrida 
writes, “phonocentrism merges with the historical 
determination of the meaning of being in general 
as presence” (Derrida, 1997). 
 
One of the dichotomies of superiority and 
inferiority that Derrida focuses on is that of logic 
and rhetoric, and he wants to question and 
reverse the relation. Habermas sees this, as 
Derrida’s attempt to avoid self-referentiality in the 
critique of reason. This is to be accomplished by 
abolishing any distinction between philosophy 
and literature and trying to bring logic and 
argumentative reason under a general analysis of 
text and literature by way of deconstruction. 
Martin J. Matustik, saw Habermas’s idea of 
performative contradiction as, something;  
 
Concretely defined within its existential 
context, an argument that attacks all rational 
argumentation, that reasons against reason 
as such, that wholly blackmails any claim to 
truth, that concludes in a rejection of 
normative Judgments that sincerely 
undermines the possibility of authenticity in 
discourse, is in contradiction with its own 
performance (Matustik, 1989). 
 
Derrida tried to appropriate Nietzsche’s idea 
that philosophical texts are not mainly about 
arguments but employment of the better rhetoric 
against the lesser ones (Habermas, 1987). Here 
what Derrida’s deconstruction tries to do is show 
that philosophical texts could be analyzed in 
literary terms just like every other text. Here, what 
we have is exposition of the different binaries in 
the text, which shows how contradictory claims 
are present, and the analysis of rhetorical 
meanings lead to affirmation of relations of 
difference. Hence, Derrida, according to 
Habermas is claiming that: “[b]lindness and 
insight are rhetorically interwoven with one 
another” (Habermas, 1987). In most so called 
philosophical texts, there is a tendency to focus 
just on the logic and arguments. What Derrida is 
claiming is that the rhetoric, strategies, 
metaphors, hidden agendas also need to be 
emphasized. So the recognition of elements other 
than logic will lead to a general analysis of texts 
with an aim of exposing their biases inscribed in 
their binaries and how both elements of rhetoric 
and argumentation are to be found on texts in 
general. Habermas asserts that the truth of 
Derrida’s deconstructive venture is based on 
three assumptions which are intrinsically related 
with one another.  
 
1. Literary criticism is not primarily a 
scientific (or scholarly: ..) enterprise but 
observes the same rhetorical criteria as 
its literary objects.  
2. Far from there being a genre distinction 
between philosophy and literature, 
philosophical texts can be rendered 
accessible in their essential contexts by 
literary criticism.  
3. The primacy of rhetoric over logic means 
the overall responsibility of rhetoric for 
the general qualities of an all embracing 
context of text, within which all genre 
distinctions are ultimately dissolved 
(Habermas, 1987).  
 
As we can see from these three points, 
criticism is seen not in terms of objective validly 
and value free assumptions but of an artistic and 
literary nature in general. There is no clear 
demarcation between works of literature and 
philosophy. Thus, all works including philosophy 
should be categorized under literature and literary 
criticism should be the proper way of 
interrogating texts. Finally, since rhetoric is 
present in every discourse and forms of inquiry, 
then the idea of science and philosophy as 
something objective, certain, valid, free of 
rhetoric, as employing experiment and logic, 
against personal values and rhetoric is to be 
questioned. Derrida maintains “Criticism, if it is 
called upon to enter into explication and 
exchange With literary writing, someday will not 
have to wait for this resistance first to be 
organized into a ‘philosophy’ which would govern 
some methodology of aesthetics whose principles 
criticism would receive. For philosophy, during its 
history has been determined as the reflection of 
poetic inauguration” (Derrida, 2005).  
 
      In deploying literary criticism, what Derrida’s 
deconstruction tries to do is, question the so-
called logical consistency and validity of 
philosophy and science, and show that in both 
everyday communication and special forms of 
inquiry, rhetorical elements are found intertwined 
with different arguments and propositions. 
Accordingly, literary criticism in deconstruction is 




not about applying a scientific method, in the 
sense of validity, objectivity, and so on. Literary 
criticism questions ideas of autonomous forms of 
inquiries, (for instance of art), and tries to show 
the interplay of different elements, logical and 
rhetorical in a given discourse. Generally it has a 
task of criticizing the metaphysical tradition’s 
search for absolute origins and final foundations, 
the prioritizing of speech over writing and so on 
(Habermas, 1987). What all this implies is that, 
literary criticism is not something that tries to 
contemplate the secondary, artistic, imaginative 
use of language.  
 
As Habermas sees it, in Derrida, literary 
criticism becomes the highest form of criticism, 
evaluating the nature of texts, exposing their 
tensions, hidden strategies and showing the 
existence of different forms of justification.  
Accordingly, If, philosophical texts are to be 
analyzed just like every other text through literary 
criticism, or the kind of criticisms relating to works 
of literature, then the critique of metaphysics 
becomes analogous to critique of literature, since 
critique of metaphysics falls under philosophical 
criticism. This is a way of subsuming philosophy 
under literature. Habermas, using Jonathan Culler, 
further argues that, this implies that literature, 
gains the status of philosophy, if literary criticism is 
employed as a critique of metaphysics (Habermas, 
1987).  
 
As Habermas sees it, as long as participants 
in an intersubjectivist communicative process are 
oriented towards understanding, then meaning 
will not be deferred. Abnormal interpretations and 
usages of language could be simply identified as 
something that hinders consensus and 
understanding. Idealizations that are found 
beyond communicative action and the fact that 
the various claims raised during communication 
are open to critique, and can be empirically 
tested will easily help to “distinguish between 
‘usual’ and ‘parasitic’ uses of language” 
(Habermas, 1987). By ‘parasitic’, Habermas 
develops his idea that the normal use of 
language in everyday communication is for 
reaching understanding. Other artistic, 
metaphorical and non-literal usages of language 
are derived from the normal usage. Further, even 
though ‘parasitic’ usages of language prevail in 
everyday communication; still actors are able to 
bypass these usages since they are oriented 
towards reaching understanding.  
 
Derrida is accused by Habermas of failing to 
distinguish between how language has a capacity 
of making the world visible and intelligible and 
how it can be used to solve specific problems. 
So, Derrida in his general notion of a ‘text’ tried to 
merge all the sciences, including philosophy, 
criticism, art, literature and so on under the 
category of literature. Habermas claims that on 
the one hand, we have everyday world of 
communication based in the different validity 
claims, while on the other, the various specialized 
forms of inquiry that are geared at solving specific 
problems. Philosophy and literary criticism are 
found between the two. 
 
 Literary criticism connects everyday world 
and the artistic realm, while philosophy, is related 
to the forms of inquiries in having a universalistic 
dimension. Philosophy facilitates disputation of 
claims between everyday world and specialized 
inquiries (Habermas, 1987). Habermas admits 
that rhetorical and poetic elements are found in 
every discourse. Still they are marginalized and 
only become dominant in poetic discourse. So, 
such rhetorical and artistic elements don’t have 
an effect in the claims and methods of the various 
forms of inquiries. Accordingly, in both everyday 
communication and the specific forms of inquiry 
the rhetorical elements can be found but are 
marginalized. What about in philosophy and 
literary criticism? Philosophy and literary criticism 
play the role of presenting the claims and findings 
of the specialized forms of inquires to everyday 
world and also presenting claims raised in 
everyday world to the domain of specialized 
inquiries. So, it’s because literary criticism and 
philosophy play a role in mediating between the 
two realms, that their language is rich in artistic, 
literary, argumentative, logical and generally 
diverse elements. Still in, both literary criticism 
and philosophy, poetic function is marginalized, 
and the major focus is on the critical analysis of 
texts and philosophical interrogation rather than 
something artistic and poetic (Habermas, 1987).  
 
Communicative Rationality Versus 
Disciplinary Power 
For Habermas, one thing common to both 
Foucault and Derrida, is their earlier 
appropriations of structuralism, as a general 
critique of modernity and its philosophy of the 
subject, and specifically as “a critic of the 
phenomenological-anthropological thought” 
(Habermas, 1987). Still, rather than approaching 
Nietzsche through Heidegger’s destruction of the 
metaphysical tradition, Foucault appealed to 
Bataille-Nietzsche’s critique of modernity as one 
that excludes certain groups and ideals like the 
mad and outcasts. Foucault further appropriated 
Bachelard’s historical critique of the sciences, 
himself focusing on the social sciences. 
Habermas thinks that Foucault’s insights from 
Levi-Strauss’s Structuralism, Bataille’s critique of 




an excluding reason, and Bachelard’s inquiries 
into the history of science, are witnessed in 
Foucault’s first major work Madness and 
Civilization (1961). 
 
Foucault’s intentions in Madness and 
Civilization were that of going beyond the 
conventions, regularities and boundaries of 
Western thinking. By doing so, Foucault had an 
intention of appropriating what was forbidden, 
considered immoral, what’s usually rejected, 
what’s considered outdated and abnormal. 
Habermas sees, Bataille’s dissolution of the 
homogenous with an experience that goes 
beyond the boundaries, being echoed in 
Foucault’s critique of reason as that conventional 
boundary which excludes, and madness as a 
possibility of going beyond the conventions set by 
reason. Foucault admits the trouble of grasping 
the truth of madness and instead of trying to 
grasp its cognitive content, turns his attention to 
those moments in history where reason managed 
to establish its sole dominance and exclude other 
alternatives.  
   
One of the ideas that Foucault developed as 
early as Madness and Civilization is that of forms 
of exclusion, supervision and disciplining. 
Foucault’s ideas of a modern form of disciplining 
as established through schools, penitentiaries 
and so on, were developed, as Habermas sees it, 
where Foucault depicts how certain mental and 
medical institutions emerged trying to establish 
the truth of the hierarchically inferior division 
between reason and Madness. The difference is 
that, while in Madness and Civilization; Foucault 
sketches how the mad and generally Madness 
came to be excluded and neglected, in later 
works such as Discipline and Punishment and 
The history of Sexuality, he shows how modern 
reason in general resulted in a repressive power 
that employs different mechanisms to organize 
the whole of humanity into its domains, and in the 
process, crushes any other alternatives. As 
Foucault sees it, “the success of disciplinary 
power derives no doubt from the use of simple 
instruments: hierarchical observation, normalizing 
judgment, and their combination in a procedure 
that is specific to it, the examination” (Rabinow, 
1984). 
 
For Foucault, modern society constitutes a 
disciplinary system which operates by using 
observation as a way of controlling actions, 
establishing criteria for measurement and finally 
testing the conformity and subjugation of 
subjects. In some occasions Foucault 
characterized this creation of subjects to ‘bio-
power’. Thus Foucault maintains “one would have 
to speak of bio-power to designate what brought 
life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit 
calculations and made knowledge-power an 
agent of transformation of human life” (Foucault, 
1990). Instead of an intersubjective arena where 
different claims to truth are entertained, modern 
society for Foucault is one that disciplines its 
subjects through different ways of accomplishing 
its goals. Foucault saw a direct relation between 
specific practices and the various human 
sciences. While the practices made available a 
‘self’ to be experimented upon, the sciences 
endorsed the practices by creating a reservoir of 
scientific techniques, terms and solutions.  
 
       Thus, in Madness and Civilization, The Birth 
of the Clinic: all the way up to Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault witnesses how modern subjects 
have been treated by different practices, 
institutions and sciences as patients who aren’t fit 
to participate in the normal, ordinary lives of 
modern societies. Thus, for Foucault, “in 
appearance, the disciplines constitute nothing 
more than an infralaw. They seem to extend the 
general forms defined by law to the infinitesimal 
level of individual lives; or they appear as 
methods of training that enable individuals to 
become integrated into these general demands” 
(Rabinow, 1984).  
 
For Foucault, the move from treating the mad 
in ‘confinements’ to institutions by providing a 
clean, suitable, medical personnel and treatments 
paved the way for a better inspection, control and 
research over the mad. The institutions led to the 
emergence of various sciences on madness and 
the depiction of madness as a danger for our 
society and reason in general. Habermas is 
especially interested in looking at the extent to 
which Foucault’s criticism of Western institutional 
and disciplinary rationality through an exposure of 
the genesis and development of the various 
sciences, in the form of archaeology and 
genealogy manages to avoid the paradox 
included in a total critique of reason which utilizes 
reason in the process. Since Foucault abandoned 
any recourse to rational argumentation and 
intersubjectivity, he appeals to archeology.  
 
Foucault’s analysis of modernity as a 
disciplinary power was facilitated through his 
methods, archeology and genealogy. Foucault 
elaborated on his Archaeological method which 
tries to identify the underlying epistemic 
structures within which the subject is constituted. 
In speaking of the Archeological method Foucault 
maintains “what I am doing is neither 
formalization nor an exegesis. But an archeology: 
that is to say, as its name indicates only too 




obviously, the description of the record---the rules 
which at a given period and for a definite society 
defined” (Foucault, 1972). In Foucault’s later 
works one finds Genealogy which views history 
as a directionless process which witnesses the 
rise and fall of diverse discursive formations. In 
trying to explore an alternative which goes 
beyond the metaphysical tradition Foucault 
argues “I have tried to get out from the 
philosophy of the subject through a genealogy of 
this subject, by studying the constitution of the 
subject across history which has led us up to the 
modern concept of the self.” (Foucault, 1993) Still 
for Habermas; Foucault’s approach is 
“presentistic, relativistic, cryptonormative”.  
(1987) For Habermas Foucault’s whole project is 
‘presentistic’ since its starting point is that the 
various forms of knowledge are also immersed in 
power relationships. Furthermore upon a closer 
analysis Foucault’s genealogy only turns out to 
be relative power/knowledge nexus. Finally 
Foucault’s genealogy is not value free since it 
has sympathy for those who are abandoned and 
excluded by the dominant discourse. 
 
Interrogating the Modern 
The discussion so far was basically focused 
around two major areas. First of all I tried to 
introduce the essence of Habermas’s discourse 
of modernity as communicative rationality. 
Secondly I tried to highlight some of the main 
points of debate in the modern/postmodern 
debate by elaborating on Habermas’s discussion 
of Derrida and Foucault in The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity.  In this section I will try to 
integrate my own insights into the debate through 
a discussion of the positive and negative aspects 
of Habermas’s discourse of modernity and 
particularly his discussion of postmodernism. 
 
1. In my opinion, the crucial aspect of 
communicative rationality that makes it strong 
when compared with the ideals developed 
throughout modernity, and the postmodern 
critics is that the concepts of responsibility and 
emancipation are highly developed in it. It is 
also a kind of rationality that could deal both a 
descriptive and emancipatory critical theory of 
modern societies. In Derrida’s deconstruction 
an attempt is made to expose what’s excluded 
in the binary operations and the search for 
origins in Western philosophical thought. But, 
as Habermas notes, the subject is lost in a 
process of meaning formation. We can see 
Derrida’s attempt to deconstruct the texts of 
Western civilization, as an attempt to open up 
and reveal the history of exclusions. Still 
Derrida didn’t propose any emancipatory, future 
ideal, except in asserting that meaning always 
comes. In Derrida’s defense we can say that 
his later works like The specters of Marx 
haven’t been taken into consideration in 
Habermas’s discourse of modernity.  
 
Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy tried 
to identify thought patterns, specific practices, 
disciplines and institutions that determined a 
particular form of subjectivity in modernity. 
Foucault exposed and hence revealed the 
concealed practices, institutions, disciplinary 
techniques of Western society. But, as 
Habermas rightly observes, Foucault was not 
able to pose a normative ideal, and hence 
didn’t find a space for responsibility. In addition, 
since the subject was not empowered in 
relation to a concept of emancipation, Foucault 
was not able to step out of power/knowledge 
nexuses. 
 
When we come to Habermas’s 
communicative rationality and discourse of 
modernity we can raise the following points. 
First of all, we are responsible for history, since 
we are active agents and participate in 
intersubjective process that empowers us. We 
have control over our destinies insofar as we 
are capable of reflecting on the background we 
inhabit; being able to reflect on our social 
structures. Secondly, there is a space for 
discussing modern society’s problems like 
anomie, meaninglessness, the holocaust and 
so on, by appealing to everyday language. 
Everyday language and communicative 
rationality have provided a space for discussing 
modern society’s problems resulting from the 
continuing rift between the everyday world and 
value spheres, and also the colonization of the 
life world. Thirdly, there is a space in 
communicative rationality for envisioning 
emancipatory ideals. This is through 
strengthening everyday communicative action, 
strengthening the value spheres, empowering 
the institutions in which the positive universal 
ideals of modernity are concretized and 
strengthening the public spheres. Thus, 
Habermas has found a space for a 
communicative rationality and a critical social 
theory of modern societies which is both 
diagnostic and could also pose emancipatory 
ideals. 
 
2. Still, Habermas’s discourse of modernity fails to 
fully address asymmetrical power relations. 
Habermas tried to explain modern society’s 
problems as resulting from the ‘colonization of 
the life world’ or the process through which the 
communicative rationality of everyday world is 
threatened by the instrumental one of the 




system. Amongst the major solutions 
Habermas proposes include, strengthening the 
life world and everyday communicative action 
to counter systemic instrumental rationality and 
strengthening autonomous public spheres. 
These are spheres freed of ideological interests 
and where positive extracts from everyday 
communication are discussed. Generally we 
can raise three points in relation to the extent to 
which Habermas’s theory of modernity 
addresses the concrete and material aspect of 
life. First, Habermas failed to see how 
asymmetric power relations are embedded in 
the life world. The materials to be reflected, the 
common sense knowledge we have of the 
world and the abiding moral rules that form a 
sense of belongingness to a community 
represent the interests of the dominant groups 
in our societies. Accordingly, biased structures 
and meanings pass down into every day 
communication. Further the horizon of 
everyday communication is limited since even 
though the life world is continually being 
reflected upon, still the dominant agendas are 
those of the oppressors. 
 
 As Enrique Dussel remarks what the 
‘interpellation’ the presenting of the claims of 
the oppressed to the exploiter, introduces is an 
exposition of unjust, asymmetrical relations in 
day to day life, and their transformation in a 
praxis that goes to the heart of the dominant 
presuppositions. Dussel remarks that, “[t]here 
is no liberation without rationality, but there is 
no critical rationality without accepting the 
interpellation of the excluded, or this would 
inadvertently be only the rationality of 
domination” (Dussel, 1996). In his article The 
architectonic of the ethics of liberation on 
material ethics and formal moralities, Dussel 
tries to come up with an argumentative ethic 
based in concrete, material economic relations. 
This is supposed to surpass ‘formal ethics’ that 
only focuses on the universal argumentative 
nature of the ethical dimension on one hand, 
and materialistic versions of ethics that only 
focus on limited material, economic relations. 
What Dussel proposes in turn is a realization of 
the two. Thus he remarks, “The goal is the 
elaboration of an ethics that is able to 
incorporate the material aspects of goods and 
the formal dimension of ethical validity and 
consesuability; every morality is the formal 
application of some substantive good” (Dussel, 
1997). Thus, Habermas’s communicative 
rationality fails to fully address the corrupted 
nature of everyday communication resulting 
from power relations. 
Secondly, Habermas’s explanations of 
modern society’s problems are focused on the 
loss of meaning, since the explanation derives 
from systems intrusion into the meaning giving 
structure of the lifeworld. This prevented 
Habermas from providing a sufficient account 
of things like slavery and colonialism which 
signify primarily conflicts in the material aspect 
of life. Thirdly, in his account of “autonomous 
public spheres,” Habermas failed to realize that 
the same problems that haunted his, Structural 
transformation of the public sphere i.e. 
asymmetric relations resulting from the 
superiority of the wealthy and educated, also 
exist in today’s public spheres. Usually, the 
agendas raised in such spheres are backed by 
the funding of institutions that impose their own 
interests and what’s discussed is usually what’s 
considered as important by intellectuals. As 
Dussel shows in his The underside of 
modernity, hierarchical relations are found in 
speech acts. To this extent, Dussel gives a 
special attention to the claim of the oppressed. 
The utterance of the oppressed has a power of 
illuminating asymmetrical power relations. 
Dussel refers to the ideal symmetrical 
communicative arena as an ‘ideal 
communicative community’ in contrast to the 
‘empirical’ one. Here, there are power relations 
and some voices are superior to others. Dussel 
also emphasized the fact that beyond 
communication one finds material, economic 
relations through which humans try to 
reproduce their life materially. Everyday 
communication is an exemplar of material 
relations. As Asger Sorensen puts it, what 
Dussel’s transmodern approach to meaning 
and validity demonstrates is that; “practical 
philosophy must never forget the body as the 
material foundation of the consciousness. It is 
with the body that we feel pleasure but it is also 
with the body we feel pain” (Sorensen, 2009). 
Thus, Habermas’s discourse of the modern 
only focuses on what Dussel calls the ‘ideal 
communicative community’. 
 
3. Habermas’s discourse of modernity is 
Eurocentric in failing to fully deconstruct the 
Eurocentric tendencies of the Western 
philosophical tradition. For Habermas, following 
Weber and Hegel, one could argue that 
modernity took shape by a universal process of 
secularization and rationalization, and through 
historical movements like the Reformation the 
Enlightenment, and French revolution. This 
ignores the fact that, amongst other things, the 
age of discoveries for Europe was not only a 
search for material inputs and economic 
superiority, but also the construction of 




Europe’s other, an inferior other, against whom 
Europe could consolidate itself. Habermas 
should have focused on how the French 
revolution only meant liberation for male whites, 
and that outside of Europe, the same 
exploitative relations dismantled by the 
revolution in Europe, were, still continuing. 
Habermas also failed in identifying what Dussel 
calls “the fallacy of developmentalism”. (Dussel, 
1993,67-68) Developed in the modern period, 
and still persisting today, Europe presents itself 
as the ideal model, in the developmental 
policies it formulates. Further, Habermas also 
did not give a sufficient account of the 
contribution of non-Western civilizations to 
modern Europe, how scientific, religious and 
moral insights were being transferred through 
commerce starting from ancient Greece. 
Instead, he simply forwards the secular 
tradition of modern Europe as the universal 
model, under the guise of an open 
communication carried out between equal 
partners.  
 
   Following the arguments of Eze, one could 
identify two truths about modernity that were not 
addressed by Habermas. First, Eze rightly 
pointed out that colonialism and modernity cannot 
be separated. Modern Europe used the colonies 
as a way of extracting material inputs and 
strengthening its greatest achievements in 
science, morality, the state and arts. Thus Eze 
maintains “the single most important factor that 
drives the field and the contemporary practice of 
African/a philosophy has to do with the brutal 
encounter of the African world with European 
modernity-an encounter optimized in the colonial 
phenomena” (1997) Also, it was the ideas that 
were found at the heart of modern Europe 
understanding of itself and best described in the 
giant philosophers like Hegel and Kant that 
provided the justifications for colonialism and 
imperialism. Thus the; 
 
significant aspects of the philosophies 
produced by Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Marx 
have been shown to originate in, and to be 
intelligible only when understood as an 
organic development within larger socio 
historical contexts of European colonialism 
and the ethnocentristic idea: Europe is the 
model of humanity, culture, and history in 
itself. (Eze, 1997) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For Habermas, communicative rationality 
provides the strongest alternative compared to 
the ideals provided by modernization, modernism 
and postmodernism.. Elaborated in terms of 
Weber’s theory of rationalization and Hegel’s 
attempt to interrogate the ‘present’, Habermas’s 
modernity provides a secularist approach to 
modern societies. Habermas’s discourse of 
modernity constitutes a response to the 
postmodernist movement in general and the 
poststructuralism of Derrida and Foucault in 
particular. From Habermas’s point of view, 
postmodernism radically deconstructs modernity 
and tries to provide a new ideal in the 
heterogeneous, the non rational, and generally in 
that which steps outside of the modern. Thus, 
Habermas defended communicative rationality 
against Derrida’s deconstruction and Foucault’s 
theory of disciplinary power, by arguing that they 
fail to recognize the communicative processes of 
modern societies under the employment of 
ordinary speech acts. Habermas’s modernity has 
a negative aspect of failing to fully unmask 
asymmetrical power relations embedded in the 
history of modernity and also failing to unconceal 
the eurocentrism of modernity. On the other side, 
Habermas’s discourse of modernity should be 
acknowledged for developing an account of 
rationality where the concepts of responsibility 
and emancipation are developed and also offers 
a critical theory of society that analyzes modern 
society’s problems and also proposes 
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